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DICKINSON LAW' REVIEW

SHOULD PROMISES BE ENFORCEABLE BY A PROMISEE WHO HAS
EXPRESSLY AGREED THAT THEY SHALL NOT IMPOSE
ANY LEGAL LIABILITY?
Judge Learned Hand, speaking for the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit, in 1929, said: 1
"It is always possible to show that the parties did not intend
to perform what they said they would, as, for example, that the
in
transaction was a joke, Theiss vs. Weiss, 166 Pa. 9, 20: ....
ascertaining what meaning to impute, the circumstances in which
the words are used is always relevant and usually indispensable
.... In the case at bar . . . . the records here were made to
evade the Mexican Law. Perhaps they were a fraud on the Mexican government.
"The question then becomes whether legal obligations shall be
attached to utterances which would otherwise not create them, because they were part of a plan to deceive third persons. We are
to distinguish between such a situation and one in which the
person deceived has acted in reliance upon the truth of the utterances, and bases his rights upon them, for here we are only
concerned with the existence of obligations between parties equally
implicated. We cannot see why their common fault should so
change the relations between them. Indeed, if we were asked to
intervene between them, and give relief based upon the sham
transaction, we might refuse; "in pari delicto potior est conditio
possidentis." Here we must raise an obligation where none would
otherwise exist, because by hypothesis both were concerned in a
fraud upon a third. As compensation, this would be fruitless;
as punishment, it would be capricious; as law, it would create an
obligation ex turpi causa."
Is the view above expressed the law of Pennsylvania? In a number of
cases, notes or other purported obligations have been given to banks without
consideration and with the expressed understanding that no legal obligation
should attach to the makers. In some instances this understanding was only
expressed by word of mouth but in others it was put in writing at the same
time the purported obligations were executed and delivered. In some cases the
suit to enforce the obligations is brought by the receiver of an insolvent bank
and in others by the bank itself as a going concern. In many cases the makers
understood the purpose to be to deceive the bank examiners but in others this
did not appear. In some cases the defendants have escaped liability. In most
of them they have not. It is proposed to trace the development of the present
Pennsylvania rule and to consider the soundness of the reasons advanced to
support it.
'New York Trust Co. v. Island Oil and Transportation Corporation, 34 F. (2d) 655.
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In Tasker's Estate, 182 Pa. 122, the receiver of a bank presented a claim
on a note for $5000.00. It appeared that to get a charter as a national bank
the president of a state bank told an old customer that the bank "needed
paper." The decedent and his son kindly put their names on two notes for
$5000.00 each and gave them to the bank without consideration. The Orphans'
Court allowed the claim but the Supreme Court reversed, John G. Johnson representing the appellant. The court held that, if the decedent had merely loaned
his accomodation note to the bank, "the bank could in no possible circumstances
be permitted to recover the money on the note for its own use from the maker."
"The doctrine is too manifestly sound to require argument in its support." The
notes were repeatedly renewed for the period of five years but it was held that
this was immaterial, if the note was a loaned note in the first place. The use
of the note by the bank "to borrow money upon, or to exhibit it as an apparent
asset of the bank" was held a sufficient reason for its many renewals. The
witness did not say it was intended to use the notes to deceive the bank examiner and it was held that as they could have been properly used by the bank
"to borrow money," it would not be assumed that there was an unlawful purpose intended. The syllabus of this case states, though the opinion leaves this
to implication, that if the notes were "intended for an unlawful purpose," e.g.
that the maker was assisting fraudulently to deceive the bank examiners, that
he would have been "estopped from setting up the want of consideration as a
defense to the note."
The first case in Pennsylvania in which the estoppel doctrine is clearly laid
down is that of State Bank of Pittsburg v. Kirk, 216 Pa. 452. All of the directors of the bank indorsed notes to take the place of a number of "bad loans"
and the officers gave the directors a certificate that the indorsed notes were to
be paid out of the bank's profits. The bank was later placed in the hands of
a receiver and he sued the indorsers. The question was said to be whether the
receiver had rights superior to those of the bank as a going concern. It was
held that while want of consideration would have prevented recovery by the
bank as such, the receiver as the representative of creditors could recover. The
reason given was that the defendants were estopped from setting up want of
consideration, the court saying:
"The creditors and depositors cannot be affected by the
secret agreement entered into between the president and cashier
of a bank and the board of directors, and it cannot be set up to
defeat a recovery in an action by the receiver on the notes."
In Peoples Bank v. Stroud, 223 Pa. 33, the action was also one by the receiver of the bank and the defense was an alleged understanding between the
makers of a note and the bank's officers that it would not be collected but that
it "would be used as an asset of the bank so as to enable it to continue business
and ultimately relieve the makers of the note from any responsibility thereon."
Again it was held that, as against the receiver, the representative of the bank's
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creditors, the makers of the note were estopped to set up want of consideration.
In Lyons v. Benney, 230 Pa. 117, the circumstances differed only in that
the action was by a receiver of a national bank appointed by the comptroller of
the currency, while the earlier cases involved insolvent state banks. The court
said:
"When an act has been done in fraud of the rights of the
creditors of the insolvent corporation, the receiver may sue for their
benefit, even though the defense set up might be valid against
the corporation itself."
It matters not that the transaction originates with the officers of the bank,
nor need the party who so lends his paper to the bank be a director or otherwise
be interested in the bank. The principle of estoppel to deny consideration applies when a receiver of an insolvent bank brings the action.
In Dominion Trust Co. v. Ridall, 249 Pa. 122, the suit was brought by the
receiver of an insolvent trust company to foreclose a mortgage given by the wife
of the company's treasurer to "repair the assets of the company." It was held
that parol evidence could not be admitted which would not only contradict but
entirely destroy the mortgage; that want of consideration could not be shown,
as the bond and mortgage were under seal. The idea of the earlier cases, that
as the receiver represented creditors, the secret agreement that the instruments
should never be enforced could not be shown as a defense, was reiterated.
In Mars National Bank v. Hughes, 256 Pa. 75, the maker of a note claimed
that he was persuaded by the cashier to give it to enable the bank to show a
note instead of mortgages, (which it could not legally hold as assets) when it
should be examined. It was held, without discussion, that the defendant could
not be heard to say that the note was not what it purported to be, as he had
given it for the purpose of enabling the bank to deceive the bank examiners.
This is the first case in which the bank itself was permitted to recover and, as
the elements of equitable estoppel were entirely lacking, it would seem that
liability was imposed as a species of punishment of the defendant. Williston
says, in a co.mment on this case,
"Any general inference from this language that a defendant cannot set up his own illegality, shared in by the plaintiff, either to
a promissory note or any other contract would be incorrect." (Vol.
5 Williston on Contracts, page 4575).
The Tasker case (182 Pa. 122) was held to rule the decision in Lackawanna
Trust Co. v. Carlucci, 264 Pa. 226, in which the maker of a note consented to
sign it only upon the express condition that he would incur no legal liability by
doing so. The treasurer of the plaintiff bank accepted the note on this condition. The court below held this to be no defense, as "this practically destroyed
the obligation." Again, the Supreme Court reversed and held that, as the bank
was not a holder for value, the general rule applied that, as between the accomodating and accomodated party, consideration can always be shown to be
wanting.
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The Tasker case and tht Carlucci case were both cited and approved in
First National Bank of Greencastle v. Baer, 277 Pa. 184 (1923). The defendants were financially interested in a corporation whose unsecured paper was
hed by the bank in a large amount. The cashier of the bank procured the
endorsement of the corporate note by promising the defendants that there would
be no personal liability, as the sole purpose of asking for their endorsement
was to avoid "complaint from the bank examiner." In the opinion of Justice
Sadler it is noted that the defendants were interested in the company for which
they endorsed. Suit by the bank on its paper was threatened. They were accomodation endorsers for their company, rather than for the bank, and so the
Tasker and Carlucci cases could be distinguished.
Justice Sadler held the defense insufficient for two reasons. First, the
cashier's promise not to look to the indorsers was beyond his authority and
there was no claim that the bank's board of directors had ratified it. Second,
"proof of a contemporaneous parol agreement is not admissible, where its effect is to destroy the instrument itself."
As to the unlawful agreement to deceive the bank examiners, it was said
that, as plaintiff could make out a prima facie case without disclosing this
agreement, and the illegality appeared solely in an agreement which was supplemental to the notes and a "collateral undertaking," the agreement would not
prevent a recovery though such agreement involved a violation of a criminal
statute. It is not suggested that the illegal agreement was in itself a further
reason for holding the defendants liablt.
In Bank of Hooversville v. Sagerson, 283 Pa. 406, the defendants signed
notes in reliance upon the assurance of the president of payee bank that they
would not be liable thereon. The bank held notes of a theatre company secured
by collateral. These papers were turned over to one of the defendants but
Sagerson, it seems, received nothing and it does not appear that he knew of or
requested the surrender of these papers. He was assured that the arrangement
was only a temporary one and that the bank wanted his name "because the bank
examiner might object" otherwise, and that his signing was "a mere matter of
form." The testimony as to these facts was held inadmissible because of the
Parol Evidence Rule. The Baer case was declared to be a "flat decision" precluding the use as a defense of the illegal "scheme to mislead the bank examiner." Though the taking of judgment on the notes was conceded to be a clear
"breach of faith," it was not such fraud as would justify the admission of parol
evidence to show it. Nor could it be shown that there was in fact no deception of the bank examiner. "The intent precludes the defense when any person
signs instruments and gives them to a bank for the sole purpose of deceiving
examiners." In other words, the illegality of the agreement, instead of being
an additional defense, now appears as a reason for excluding the other defenses
of want of contractual intent and want of consideration. The idea appears to
be that an estoppel should be declared, regardless of the absence of the element
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generally deemed essential, namely, reliance upon the false appearance by the
one claiming the benefit of the estoppel.
The bank here was the plaintiff, not the Commissioner of Banking as
liquidator of a closed bank. Tht stockholders were the ones who profited by
the collection of the notes. If the bank is solvent, creditors are not interested.
The bank's officers concocted the scheme, so they were not deceived. They
merely utilized rules of law to perpetrate a confidence game at the expense of
their too trusting and accomodating friends. Again it was intimated that the
result might have been different, if the bank's directors had ratified the illegal
agreement made by the bank's president but no claim was made that this had
occurred. 2 If estoppel is the real reason for imposing liability in these cases,
it is very hard to see how it matters whether the bank is represented by its
president or its directors in making the illegal bargain.
The sound reason for the recovery permitted in the Sagerson, as in the
Baer case, is that the paper, in both cases, appears to have been given more to
accomodate friends of the defendants than to accomodate the banks, they actually
parting with value on the faith of the new names. See Allen v. First National
Bank, 127 Pa. 51.
In Speier v. Michelson, 303 Pa. 66, at page 70, Justice Kephart says that
the Sagerson case "cut away the dead timber from the Parol Evidence Rule as
reflected in our earlier decisions." This case holds that an affidavit of defense
isinsufficient to prevent a summary judgment, if it merely alleges a parol
agreement on the part of the plaintiff that payment was to be made only from
a particular fund. However, it is stated that the defendant, after judgment,
may show this agreement as the basis for an application to the court to control
the execution of the judgment.
The danger involved in serving as a "straw man" is illustrated in Germantown Trust Co. v. Emhardt, 321 Pa. 561. A mortgagee, to avoid a merger,
took title to the mortgaged property in the name of an employee. Later the
straw man is asked to sign a guaranty of payment of a prior lien, in order to
secure an extension of the time of payment. He demurred but was persuaded
to sign by the assurance that he would incur no personal liability. This assurance was given by the holder of the prior lien. The modern Parol Evidence
Rule was held to exclude proof of these facts.
The most extended statement of the considerations of public policy which
dictate the enforcement of purported obligations given to banks for purposes
of "window dressing" is contained in Bangor Trust Co. v. Christine, 297 Pa.
64.
The payee bank was the plaintiff. A jury found that there was no consideration to support the note sued on. The note was merely loaned to the
bank on the request of its principal officers, the makers being assured that it
2

See, to same effect, United States Nat. Bk. v. Evans, 296 Pa. 541, 546.
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would be returned in a short time. The note was in fact entered on the bank's
books as an asset and checks of a corporation in which the bank's officers were
interested and which overdrew its account were withdrawn. It is apparent that
the defendant's note had to be collected to avoid a loss to the stockholders of
the bank, though the loss was probably incurred when the overdrafts were honored by the bank.
Justice Schaffer says that governmental supervision of banks is for the protection of the public. He does not say whether this means depositors and other
creditors or whether it includes the stockholders. He states that one who lends
himself to a deception of the bank examiners "must abide the consequences of
what he does." He refers to the examiners as "concerned for the bank's
solvency" and though the plaintiff bank may have had a large surplus, it was
held that the defendant could not set up that he had received no consideration
for his note. He quotes from a Montana decision, in which it is said: "We can
conceive of no circumstances under which a bank can require an accomodation
note on its own account for any legitimate purpose." But, as has been noted
above, John G. Johnson had no difficulty in persuading our Supreme Court in
Tasker's Estate that such a transaction might have an entirely legitimate purpose.
Several recent cases have been disposed of on the authority of the cases
which treat the modern Parol Evidence RuIl as precluding parol proof that
there was an express agreement that signing papers for the accomodation of the
bank would impose no legal liability to it: Third National Bk. and Tr. Co. of
Scranton v. Rodgers, 330 Pa. 523 and Lycoming Trust Co. v. Smithgall, 334 Pa.
4; but the most recent decision reverts to the idea that enforcement of such
obligations is a just penalty to impose on one who aids in an unlawful purpose.
In Western Savings and Deposit Bank v. Sauer, 343 Pa. 332, it is said:
"A person who executes an obligation 'for the accomodation of the
bank' does so for the unlawful purpose of deceiving the creditors,
stockholders or depositors of the bank and the bank examiner who
is acting for them. The courts will not relieve him of the consequences of his fraudulent act but will 'leave him bound who has
bound himself.' "
The cases in which a solvent bank is the plaintiff appear to fall within
the rule that when the parties are equally in fault, the position of the defendant
is the stronger. Contracts Restatement, Sec. 598, p. 1110. But when a refusal
to enforce an illegal bargain would produce a harmful effect on the very parties
for whose protection the law making the bargain illegal exists, then the enforcement of the promise has a greater tendency to diminish the number of such
agreements than would the refusal to do so. Contracts Restatement, sec. 601.
In First National Bank of Williamsburg v. Smith, 132 Pa. Super. Ct. 73
(1938) Judge Cunningham held that want of consideration could be set up
by the maker of a note held by a bank and that no number of renewals will
furnish a basis for waiver or estoppel. The maker testified that the bank's
president told him that he had some notes "in bad shape, and that the bank
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'xaminer was coming and he wanted to know if I would give him a note and
he would renew it from time to time until the operation would pay for it."
It is said that if the maker gave his note "for the purpose of deceiving bank
examiners," he would be estopped from asserting lack of consideration as a defense, citing the cases mentioned above and also First Nat. Bank of Bangor v.
Beck, 325 Pa. 117. This is a case in which the notes were given by the bank's
directors to keep the bank open and as stockholders, they had a direct interest
in doing this. This supplied consideration but the principle of estoppel was the
one invoked.
Judge Cunningham recognized that a note may be given "to help out a
bank" as was found to be the case in Terre Hill Nat. Bank v. Sensenig, 95 Pa.
Super. Ct. 368. Judge Trexler, in this case, said:
"Sensenig was lending his credit to the bank to overcome an embarrassing situation, (assets listed as bad by the bank 'xaminer)
the jury found that he got nothing for his note and as long as
note did not pass to a third party, in due course, he was not
the
iiable."
Both these Superior Court cases hark back to the Carlucci case in 264 Pa. 226,
and ignore the idea expressed in the Christine case in 297 Pa. 64, that there are
no circumstances under which any legitimate purpose could be served by giving
a note to a bank for its own accomodation. If this is conceded to be true, then,
is it not time to say flatly that when one gives his note to a bank, he will be
held liable to pay it according to its terms and defenses which would be good,
if the note were given to any other holder, are not available, and this, whether
the suit is by the bank as a going concern or by the liquidator of an insolvent
bank? At present we have two lines of cases, which it seems impossible to
reconcile, and this situation merely invites litigation to ascertain which line will
be followed in each new case.3
It has been noted that in Speier v. Michelson, 303 Pa. 66, judgment was
entered for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense, because the modern parol
evidence rule would prevent proof of the alleged parol agreement. It is doubtful whether this is now the law, for in Friend, conservator of National Bank of
America v. Kuhn, 316 Pa. 233, it was held that the rule should never be applied
in determining whether or not judgment should be entered for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense. The affidavit of defense set up that the note sued
on was without consideration, that it was given for the bank's accomodation,
that the bank's officers "told" the defendant (a woman) that it "was merelya formality to keep the note current" instead of an overdue note of the estate
3That the parol evidence rule does not preclude proof by parol evidence of a contemporaneous
agreement which renders the written agreement void, either for illegality or for want of consideration,see Sec. 238 (b) of the Contracts Restatement.
As to liability on documents evidencing contracts but intended to deceive taxing authorities, see 114 A. L. R. 357-373. As to notes given as an accommodation to banks, see 64

A. L. R. 595, for annotation.
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of which the defendant was the executrix. She was told the note would not
bind her and that she would not be called upon to pay it.
Justice Simpson declared that if these facts were properly proven and believed, to hold this woman liable "would be so far from the realms of justice
as not to be thinkable." In the Emhardt case, in 321 Pa. 561, supra, judgment
was again entered for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense and the Kuhn
case was said to be explained because defendant had set up "fraudulent misrepresentations.
If the original payee of a non-negotiable instrument will admit that he
told the maker that she would be subjected to no liability as the result of signing it, recovery by an assignee of the instrument cannot be had. It is no objection that the evidence rests in parol and contradicts the instrument. This is so
held in Fed. Res. Bank of Phila. v. Geardon, 331 Pa. 65. The woman defendant in this case acted for the accommodation of her employer in signing a bond
and mortgage. If she had done as much for a bank, she would have had to
pay, it seems. Dominion Trust Co. v. Ridall, 249 Pa. 122, supra. The Geardon
case was held to be ruled by the Kuhn case. Both defendants were women.
This may or may not be worth noting.
It will be observed that originally our Supreme Court saw no more objection to the loan of one's note to a bank than to an individual and the idea
that the bank itself could collect such a note was regarded as too absurd to
warrant discussion. Then came the line of cases involving insolvent institutions
and the idea developed that the receiver, though not a purchaser, should have
the rights of a holder in due course, because the depositors' losses might have
been less, if the bank had been closed at an earlier date and because the examiners had been misled by counting the loaned note as an asset. These cases
stressed the fact that the real parties involved were the bank's creditors and
not the bank as a corporation. That the true character of the notes could be
proven without resort to parol evidence is thus immaterial, when a receiver
is the plaintiff.
Then came the cases in which the bank itself brought the suit and the aid
given the bank in deceiving the bank examiners is given as the reason for allowing a recovery.
In the Carlucci case the court below took the view that a purported obligation could not be "destroyed" by parol proof of the real agreement, but was reversed for so holding. This case has never been overruled and it is followed
in one line of cases. On the other hand the strict application of the new parol
evidence rule in all the recent cases would indicate that today the decision of the
lower court in the Carlucci case would be upheld.
Of course, where any kind of benefit accrues to the maker of the note,
directly or indirectly, or to one whom he is intending to help, the bank properly
is allowed to recover.
The idea that a loaned note should be collected because the officers had
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no authority to borrow anybody's note is unsound and has been abandoned
in the later cases. If the premise is true, the note borrowed does not become
an asset of the bank and it should be returned to the lender.
At first, the element of illegality was treated as an obstacle to recovery
and the bank had to avoid disclosing the illegality in making out its case. Now,
it is the very ground for holding a gratuitous promise enforceable. Defenses
normally available are forfeited, as a penalty for participation in an illegal
transaction. There is no locus poenitentiae in these cases. The note may not
be reclaimed before the bank examiners arrive, it seems. The "intent," not the
success of the scheme, is what is to be punished.
In some cases the parol agreement is said to amount to such fraud as opens
the door to parol evidence. In others it is said to be only "bad faith."
Perhaps it is less reprehensible to manufacture apparent obligations to deceive a foreign government, (Mexico) than to do so to deceive an agency of
the state in which the action is brought. May this be a possible basis for distinguishing the case from which we have quoted at the beginning of this comment?
JOSEPH P. McKEEHAN

